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STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION: SMALL V. UNITED
STATES DARKENS THE ALREADY MURKY WATERS OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968 Congress passed The Gun Control Act in part to prevent
firearms from getting into the hands of dangerous individuals.1
Congress determined that a prior conviction for crimes punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year was an indication that an
individual was potentially dangerous.2 Therefore, the Gun Control Act
restricted the ownership, possession, and use of firearms by individuals
with such prior convictions.3 The current version of this statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), provides that it is unlawful for an individual “who
has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm.4
In the case of Small v. United States,5 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a circuit split over the proper interpretation of §
922(g)(1).6 The circuits had split over whether the proper interpretation
of the terms “convicted in any court” included convictions from foreign
courts.7 The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits all held that foreign
1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 901, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197,
225 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006)). Congress was careful to point out that the
purpose of the law was not to restrict or place an undue burden on law abiding citizens on the
acquisition, possession, or use of firearms for lawful purposes. § 901(b); see infra notes 27-38 and
accompanying text (discussing of the history of the Gun Control Act); infra notes 155-163 and
accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose of the Gun Control Act); see also William J.
Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 79 (1999) (describing the
Gun Control Act as “the legal core of national gun policy in the United States”).
2. See infra notes 155-163 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1)).
3. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act § 922(e); see infra notes 27-38 and
accompanying text (discussing the background of the Gun Control Act).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). See infra note 31 for the full text of this
statute.
5. 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
6. Id. at 387.
7. See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 90 (2d. Cir. 2004) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922 did
not encompass foreign convictions); United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003),
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convictions could be used as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1).8 The
Second and Tenth Circuits both interpreted § 922(g)(1) to not allow
foreign convictions to be used as a predicate offense.9
In Small v. United States, Gary Small had been convicted of
possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) based on a prior conviction
from a Japanese court for which he was sentenced to a five year prison
term.10 Small argued that the term “any court” in § 922(g)(1) applied
only to domestic convictions,11 while the government argued that the
proper interpretation allowed the use of foreign convictions.12 While the
government’s argument prevailed before the Third Circuit, a Supreme
Court majority agreed with Small and followed the Second and Tenth
Circuits, which interpreted the terms of § 922(g)(1) narrowly to include
only domestic convictions.13
The Court’s decision in Small v. United States is notable, not only
because of the dangerous loophole it has provided convicted felons,14 but
also because it highlights the ongoing debate over the methods courts
employ to interpret statutes.15 The majority opinion is an example of the
corruption that can occur to the plain meaning of a statute when a court
looks too far beyond the text of the statute.16 The result in this case is a
tortured interpretation of the term “any court” and the creation of a new

rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (holding § 922 could encompass foreign convictions); United States v.
Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding § 922 did not encompass foreign
judgments); United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding a foreign conviction
could properly be used as a predicate offense); United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding the term “any court” applied to foreign convictions); see also Bean v. United States,
89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837 (E.D. Tex 2000), aff’d, 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 71
(2002) (holding that foreign convictions do not automatically qualify as predicate offenses).
8. See Small, 333 F.3d at 428; Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96; Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
9. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 90; Concha, 233 F.3d at 1250-51.
10. 544 U.S. at 387.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 388.
13. Id. at 387; see also infra notes 104-111 and accompanying text (discussing the majority
opinion in Small).
14. See infra notes 137 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers presented by the
majority’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)).
15. See infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the plain
meaning doctrine in Small v. United States); infra notes 131-140 and accompanying text (discussing
the application of the canon against absurdities); infra notes 141-154 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of legislative history in interpreting § 922(g)(1)); infra notes 155-163 and
accompanying text (discussing of the legislative purpose of § 922(g)(1)); infra notes 164-195 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of the presumption against extraterritorial application
to Small v. United States).
16. See infra notes 119-195 and accompanying text (analyzing the majority’s misuse of
various methods of statutory interpretation in construing § 922(g)(1)).
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canon of construction by the majority.17 The majority derived this new
canon of an “assumption about the reach of domestically oriented
statutes” from the longstanding canon against extraterritorial
application.18 This new canon imposes a clear statement restriction on
Congress with regard to statutes which regulate activities within the
borders of the United States, but may include foreign facts.19 The
correct interpretation of § 922(g)(1), when properly applying methods of
statutory interpretation, is that the words “convicted in any court”
include convictions in “any court” — including foreign courts.20
Part II of this Note will examine the background of this issue by
exploring the history and purpose of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and
the circuit split arising over the interpretation of the words “any court”
under § 922(g)(1).21 Part III will focus on Small v. United States in
detail, including the underlying facts, procedural history, and majority
and dissenting opinions.22 Part IV will analyze this decision and argue
that the majority misused canons of statutory interpretation to reach an
interpretation that is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.23 The
section will also discuss the majority’s “assumption about the reach of
domestically oriented statutes” and explore the implications of this
opinion on future legislation and cases.24 Part V concludes that this case
is part of a larger problem of courts relying too heavily on outside
sources when interpreting a statute, which causes them to stray too far
from the text of the statute.25 It also concludes that to prevent continued
misinterpretations of statutes a more consistent approach to statutory
interpretation is needed with a stronger adherence to the plain meaning
of the statute, less reliance on outside sources, and a disciplined
application of canons of construction.26

17. See infra notes 119-195 and accompanying text (discussing the majority and dissent’s
interpretation of the words “any court”).
18. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19. See infra notes 164-195 and accompanying text (discussing the majority’s application of
the canon against extraterritorial application); infra notes 196-213 and accompanying text
(exploring the potential implications of the Small decision).
20. See infra notes 123-195 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 27-70 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 71-118 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 123-163 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 164-195 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 215-222 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 215-222 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Gun Control Act
Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968 in response to
concerns over an increase in gun violence in the United States.27 The
Act sought to prevent crime by restricting the availability of firearms to
individuals deemed unfit to possess them because of age, criminal
background, or incompetency.28 Congress enacted the statute as a series
of amendments to the Safe Streets Act,29 and it was superseded in 1986
by the current version of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 and 922.30
The current version of § 922(g)(1) specifically prohibits firearm
possession by individuals with certain criminal backgrounds.31 The
provision makes it unlawful for a person “convicted in any court of a
crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment” to possess a
firearm.32 The proper interpretation of the scope of this provision caused
a split among the United States Courts of Appeals.33 The Circuit Courts
disagreed on the proper interpretation of the term “convicted in any
court” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1) and, more specifically, whether
this language applied to individuals whose criminal backgrounds are
27. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (discussing Congress’s
purpose behind passing the Gun Control Act of 1968 as a means of reducing “the widespread traffic
in firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the
public interest” (quoting Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1201, 82 Stat. 236 (1968) (repealed 1986))). Senator
Thomas Dodd, a major proponent of the Gun Control Act, began studying firearm issues as
Chairman of the Juvenile Justice Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961.
Vizzard, supra note 1, at 80. However, the issue did not receive sufficient support from Congress or
from the American public until the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King and United States
Senator Robert Kennedy highlighted the need for greater regulation to reduce gun violence. Id. at
80-85; see infra notes 155-163 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the Gun Control
Act of 1968).
28. Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 824 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)); see also supra
note 27 (discussing the historical reasons for the Gun Control Act).
29. See Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp 1002, 1006 (D. Vt. 1971); Vizzard,
supra note 1, at 83-85.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922 (2006).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This provision states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (analyzing the circuit split over the use of foreign
convictions as predicate offenses).
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made up of convictions from foreign courts.34
The Circuit Courts and the United States Supreme Court have
employed various methods of statutory interpretation to discern the
intent of Congress in passing § 921(g)(1).35 Although there is a great
deal in the way of legislative history for these statutes, the history does
not specifically address whether Congress intended to include foreign
convictions when it used the words “convicted in any court” in the
statute.36 In resolving the Circuit split, the Supreme Court in Small v.
United States ultimately decided that the term referred only to domestic
courts and precluded use of foreign convictions as a predicate offense
under the statute.37 In response to Small, the House and Senate have
proposed amendments to § 922 which would include foreign convictions
as predicate offenses.38

34. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005).
35. See id. at 388 (using various canons of interpretation and looking to the legislative history
of § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 90 (2003) (discussing the plain meaning
doctrine and reliance on legislative history); United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir.
2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (rejecting parties’s arguments as to the proper interpretation of “any
court” and holding generally that foreign convictions can count as predicate offenses); United States
v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing the legislative history, related
statutory provisions, and the rule of lenity); United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989)
(discussing legislative history, similar statutory provisions, and the rule of lenity); United States v.
Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing legislative history and the rule of lenity).
36. See S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968) (defining predicate crimes as Federal crimes
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp 28-29 (1968) (adopting language “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year”); see also infra notes 141-154 (analyzing the legislative
history of § 922(g)(1)).
37. 544 U.S. at 394.
38. S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005); HR 1168, 110th Cong. (2007). The amendment proposed by
S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005) would have included the following language:
Sec. 2 Prohibition of Firearms Sales to Person Convicted of a Felony in a Foreign Court.
Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is amended . . .
(2) in subsection (g) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:
“(1) who has been convicted—
“(A) in any court within the United States, of a crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding 1 year; or
“(B) in any court outside the United States, of a crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding 1 year (except for any crime involving the violation of an antitrust law), if the conduct giving rise to the conviction would be punishable in any court
within the United States by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year had such conduct
occurred within the United States;”.
Id. HR 1168, 110th Cong. (2007) would amend § 922(g)(1) “by striking ‘court of,’ and inserting
‘court, including any foreign court . . . .”
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B. Circuit Split
A brief overview of the Circuit split illustrates the various
arguments made in the debate between various interpretations of § 922.
The first court that addressed the issue of whether a foreign
conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under § 922(h)(1) was the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Winson.39 In Winson, the defendant was
indicted under § 922(h)(1) on the basis of two prior criminal
convictions, one in Argentina for possessing counterfeit currency and
one in Switzerland for fraud.40 The district court dismissed the
indictment, relying on the rule of lenity.41 The lower court also found
persuasive a similar firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1202, which applied by
its explicit terms only to convictions “by a court of the United States or
of a State or any political subdivision thereof . . . .”42
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court.43 The court found the statute unambiguous.44 In addition, the

39. 793 F.2d 754.
40. Id. at 756. Winson was indicted on four counts: two counts of unlawful receipt of a
firearm in violation of § 922(h)(1) and two counts of knowingly making a false statement to a dealer
in violation of § 922(a)(6). Id. at 755-56.
41. Id. at 756. The rule of lenity provides that ambiguity concerning a criminal statute should
be resolved in favor of the defendant. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (citing Bell
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)); see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 n.10
(1980) (describing the concept of lenity as a “settled rule”). Two policies support the rule of lenity:
first that defendants be given fair warning of prohibited conduct under the statute; and second,
because criminal punishment is the moral condemnation of the community, it should be the
legislature that defines conduct that deserves such condemnation, not the courts. United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
42. Winson, 793 F.2d at 756. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 provided in relevant part:
Any person who—(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or
any political subdivision thereof of a felony, . . . and who receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act,
any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.
Winson, 793 F.2d at 756 n.3 (quoting § 1202 (repealed 1986)). This statute was reenacted into the
Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986, which was passed to consolidate several separate statutes
precluding different individuals from possessing firearms. Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does “Any”
Mean “All” or Does “Any” Mean “Some”? An Analysis of the “Any Court” Ambiguity of the
Armed Career Criminal Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 147, 175-76 (2002); see Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984). A portion of the repealed § 1202 is now codified under § 922(g),
while the remaining portion is codified under § 924(e). Basler, supra, at 175-76. Both §§ 922 and
924 use the broader “convicted in any court” language as opposed to the more specific “convicted
by a court of the United States or of a State” from § 1202. Id. The legislative history does not
contain any reference as to why the less specific language was adopted. Id.
43. Winson, 793 F.2d at 759.
44. Id. at 757.
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Sixth Circuit did not find persuasive the reasoning of the district court
comparing § 922(g)(1) with § 1202.45 The court was not persuaded by
the potential due process implications of basing federal criminal
punishment in part on foreign convictions.46 Instead, the court found
that the object of the statute was to keep firearms out of the hands of
persons with serious criminal records,47 and this included individuals
convicted of serious crimes abroad.48 The court also relied on the fact
that Congress provided relief from the disability imposed under
§ 922(g)(1)49 under circumstances where the applicant was not likely to
be a danger to public safety and granting relief would not be contrary to
public interest.50
45. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted several Supreme Court decisions discussing the tension
between §§ 922 and 1202. Id. See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111 (1983);
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1980); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 11921 (1979). In Winson, the Sixth Circuit specifically noted that in Batchelder the Supreme Court
ruled Congress’s intent was to give the two titles independent application. Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
46. Winson, 793 F.2d at 757. The Sixth Circuit found the convictions in Argentina and
Switzerland did not violate the defendant’s civil rights and were not contrary to American
constitutional law. Id.
47. Id. at 758.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court felt that this remedy safeguarded individuals whose foreign convictions
may have been “constitutionally infirm.” Id.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). The statute states in relevant part:
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving
firearms or ammunition may make application to the Attorney General for relief from the
disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer,
shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and the Attorney General may grant
such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the
disability, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not
be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief
would not be contrary to the public interest. Any person whose application for relief
from disabilities is denied by the Attorney General may file a petition with the United
States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such
denial.
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2006).
Congress had delegated authority to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
to investigate applications for relief from disability under § 925(c), but since 1992 the ATF’s annual
appropriation has prohibited the ATF from using any funds to investigate such applications. United
States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 73 (2002). Bean argued that the ATF’s failure to act on his application
constituted a denial under § 925(c), which would allow for judicial review. Id. at 75. The Court
held that the procedure set forth under the statute required an actual decision by the ATF before
allowing for judicial review and did not give the district court “independent jurisdiction to act on an
application.” Id. at 76. The result of this appropriations bar is to deny relief from disability to any
applicant either through the ATF review or through judicial review. Id. at 74-75.
Interestingly, Bean, a gun dealer from Texas, was seeking relief from disability based on a
felony conviction from a Mexican court. Id. at 72-73. The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court did
not address the issue of whether his Mexican conviction could serve as a predicate offense under
§ 922(g)(1). See Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001),
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The Fourth Circuit was the next circuit to tackle the issue in United
States v. Atkins.51 The court agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in
Winson that the legislative history of § 922(g)(1) did not offer any
additional insight into Congress’s intended meaning of the term “in any
court,” nor did consideration of the legislative history reveal any
ambiguity in the term not evident from the face of the statute.52 The
Fourth Circuit considered the plain meaning of § 922(g)(1) and found
that Atkins’s conviction satisfied the requirements of the statute.53 The
court also reasoned that any attack of the statute based on ambiguity
should be directed on the term “court,” rather than “any” because the
term “any” was unambiguous, “being all-inclusive in nature.”54
However, without specifying whether the term “court” was ambiguous
or not, the court went on to find that Atkins’ conviction in an English
court could properly be used as a predicate crime under § 922(g)(1) due
to the similar legal systems under which the United States and England
operate.55
In United States v. Concha, the Tenth Circuit split from the Sixth
and the Fourth Circuits and ruled that foreign convictions cannot be used
as predicate convictions under § 922(g)(1).56 The court found sufficient
rev’d, 537 U.S. 71; and Bean, 537 U.S. 71. The district court held that foreign convictions could
not be a “de facto rule” used as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1) and used issues raised over the
fairness of Bean’s Mexican conviction as a basis for allowing judicial relief under § 925(c). 89 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 837 (E.D. Tex 2000), aff’d, 253 F.3d 234, rev’d, 537 U.S. 71.
51. United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989). Atkins was charged under
§ 922(g)(1) with a predicate felony conviction from England. Id. at 95. He argued that the English
conviction should not be used because “Congress, dealing with affairs in this country, do [sic] not,
unless they explicitly so state, mean a reference to ‘any court’ to extend to the court of a foreign
jurisdiction.” Id. In addition, he argued that the statute was ambiguous and, therefore, the rule of
lenity should apply. Id. at 96.
52. Id. After discussing the stipulated facts, the brief opinion first discusses the legislative
history and then moves on to discuss the language of the statute:
[T]he scant legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 922, as well as that of a similar provision in
18 U.S.C. App. § 1202, and the cases and materials construing the two statutes offer no
illumination as to Congress’ intended meaning nor serve to inject any uncertainty into
the subject language . . . . Thus, considering the plain meaning of the subject language,
Atkins’ conviction appears to satisfy the requirements of the statute.
Id.; see infra notes 141-154 (discussing the proper use of legislative history).
53. Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court pointed out that England provided the origin of the jurisdictional system in
the United States and both used systems of common law and statute. Id.
56. 233 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2000). Concha was arrested in connection with a
domestic dispute. Id. at 1251. While at the Taos New Mexico police station, he entered into an
altercation with police officers in which he took an officer’s loaded gun and attempted to shoot the
officer. Id. Concha was charged with, among other crimes, being a felon in possession of a firearm
under § 922(g)(1). Id. Concha did not challenge the validity of his conviction under § 922(g)(1), as
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ambiguity in the statutory language as to whether Congress intended to
include foreign convictions and, therefore, invoked the rule of lenity to
preclude use of predicate foreign convictions.57
The Tenth Circuit also looked to another statutory provision,
§ 921(a)(20), to inform the meaning of the term “any court” as used in
§ 922(g)(1).58 The court reasoned that, by excluding certain federal and
state crimes in § 921(a)(20) without similar mention of foreign crimes,
§ 921 and by analogy § 922 were only meant to cover domestic crimes.59
The court was also concerned that foreign criminal defendants were not
afforded the same constitutional protections as domestic criminal
defendants.60 However, the court thought this concern would be
compelling only if the defendant had no way to attack the validity of the
foreign conviction.61 Under Supreme Court precedent, however, such a
collateral attack is still possible through a habeas petition.62
Nevertheless, the court felt that this protection was insufficient to infer
that Congress intended to include foreign convictions under the statute.63
he had a prior felony conviction from California. Id. Rather, he argued against the use of three
foreign convictions from the United Kingdom which were used to enhance his sentence under the
Armed Career Criminal Act. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). Section 924(e)(1) provides that
if a person “has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title
for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, he must be imprisoned for a minimum of fifteen
years.” Id.
57. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1250-51. The court found that the “plain language of § 922(g)(1)
gives no more guidance than does § 924(e)(1) as to what constitutes ‘convictions by any court.’” Id.
at 1253.
58. Id. Section 921(a)(20) provides an exception for convictions of certain business and antitrust violations and states in relevant part:
The term ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ does not
include-(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices, restraint of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business
practices, or (B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor
and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
59. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1253-54. The court also felt that including foreign convictions
would result in more foreign convictions being covered than domestic convictions, due to the
exclusion of domestic anti-trust convictions. Id. at 1254. In addition, the court also looked to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 2K2.1, which provides for a sentence enhancement for being
a felon in possession of a firearm, and noted that the definitions provided in the Guidelines are
limited to offenses under federal or state law. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) (holding that § 924 itself does
not authorize collateral attacks on predicate convictions, but leaving intact the possibility of
challenging the predicate conviction through a separate habeas petition); Gamble v. Parsons, 898
F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding a defendant may bring a habeas petition against a current
sentence when it has been enhanced by a prior unconstitutional conviction).
63. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1255. The court pointed out that a habeas petition could not be filed
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The court acknowledged that there were policy reasons which
supported a finding that Congress may have intended the use of foreign
convictions as predicate offenses, such as the fact that foreign criminals
are likely to be as dangerous as domestic criminals.64 However, the
court found equally persuasive the policy arguments against such an
interpretation and, as a result, applied the rule of lenity, holding that
foreign convictions could not be used as predicate offenses.65
In United States v. Gayle, the Second Circuit also refused to allow
foreign convictions as predicate convictions under § 922(g)(1).66 The
court began by looking at what it described as the plain text of the statute
as a whole, not just the phrase “any court” in isolation.67 The Second
Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s rationale in Concha, that the
definitions provided in § 921(20) created an ambiguity as to whether §
922(g)(1) included foreign convictions.68 Finding the statute ambiguous,
the Second Circuit consulted the legislative history of § 922(g)(1) to
uncover Congress’s intended meaning.69 The court went further than
other circuits in construing the statutory history of § 922(g)(1), holding
that the history clearly showed that Congress did not intend foreign
convictions to be used as predicate offenses.70
until after a defendant began serving his sentence, which could result in a defendant spending time
in prison before an appeals court could review the conviction. Id. In addition, a defendant would
bear the burden of proving deficiencies in the foreign conviction. Id. Such a burden could be
difficult to prove using records of foreign judicial proceedings. Id.
64. Id. at 1256.
65. Id.
66. United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 90 (2003). Defendant Ingram was arrested on
suspicion of illegally entering the United States from Canada. Id. After his arrest, large quantities
of firearms and ammunition were found in his hotel room. Id. Ingram was charged with several
crimes, including a violation of § 922(g)(1) with a Canadian conviction as the predicate offense. Id.
67. Id. at 92-93 (“The text’s plain meaning can best be understood by looking to the statutory
scheme as a whole and placing the particular provision within the context of that statute.” (quoting
Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003))).
68. Id. at 93.
69. Id. The court stated they were justified in looking to “authoritative legislative history”
because § 922(g)(1) was “susceptible to divergent understandings.” Id. at 94. The court went on to
describe the conference committee report as the “most enlightening source of legislative history”
and “the most authoritative and reliable materials of legislative history.” Id. (quoting Disabled in
Action of Metro. New York v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2000)); see infra notes 141154 (discussing the authority and reliability of legislative history).
70. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 96. The Court cited the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the
Gun Control Act as “strongly suggest[ing] that Congress did not intend foreign convictions to serve
as predicate offenses under the felony-in-possession statute.” Id. at 94 (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1501,
at 3 (1968)). It relied on the Committee’s definition of the term felony, which was defined as a
“Federal crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year or a State law violation classified
as a ‘felony.’” Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1501). The Second Circuit saw this definition as clear
evidence that the Senate only contemplated State or Federal convictions for purposes of the Gun
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
On June 2, 1998, Gary Sherwood Small purchased a gun from a
Pennsylvania gun dealer and filled out the required ATF paperwork.71
In the paperwork, Small answered “no” to a question asking whether he
had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in
prison.72 However, Small had in fact been convicted of crimes in Japan
in 1994 for which he was sentenced to five years of imprisonment,
followed by eighteen months of parole.73 Small’s handgun, along with
over 300 rounds of ammunition, was uncovered during a search of his
apartment, which was conducted pursuant to a search warrant.74
A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Small of violating 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), using his conviction in Japan as the predicate
offense.75
B. Procedural History
In the district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Small
Control Act. Id. The court next looked to the House Conference Report, which contained § 922’s
current language of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Id. at 9495 (citing H.R. Rep. 90-1965, at 4, 8, 28-29 (1968)). Although the language differed, the court
noted that the House Report did not explicitly disagree with the Senate Report limitation of felonies.
Id. at 95. The court also pointed to a lack of discussion in the House and Senate reports of the
concerns raised by using foreign convictions, discussion the court felt would in all likelihood have
taken place had foreign convictions been considered. Id.
71. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (No. 03750), 2003 WL 22867724.
72. Id. The precise question to Small on this form was “[H]ave you ever been convicted in
any court of a crime for which the judge could have imprisoned you for more than one year, even if
the judge actually gave you a shorter sentence?” Brief for the United States at 4, Small, 544 U.S.
385 (No. 03-750), 2004 WL 1844488. Individuals are required to provide truthful background
information before purchasing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B) (2006).
73. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 3. In December 1992, Small shipped via
cargo plane a water heater from the United States to Osaka, Japan. Id. at 2. The shipment raised the
suspicion of Customs officials as it was the third water heater Small had shipped to Japan that year,
and the officials found it unusual that someone would “go out of his way to bring a water tank from
the U.S.” Id. The shipment was x-rayed, and the officials discovered firearms packaged inside. Id.
When Small arrived to pick up the shipment, he was served with a search warrant and the package
was searched. Id. at 2-3. Custom officials found two rifles, eight pistols, and 410 ammunition
shells. Id. at 3. He was subsequently indicted and convicted in a Japanese court on multiple
violations of Japan’s Guns and Knives Control Law, the Explosives Control Law, and Customs
Law. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 3.
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sought to have his indictment dismissed on the basis that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) banned only those persons convicted in domestic courts
from possessing firearms.76 The district court reviewed the decisions of
the three prior Courts of Appeals that had addressed the issue77 and
followed the Fourth and Sixth Circuits which reasoned that a plain
reading of the term “any court” in § 922(g)(1) included foreign
convictions.78 While Small also argued that his Japanese conviction was
the result of a fundamentally unfair proceeding,79 the district court
rejected this contention, concluding that the conviction was consistent
with concepts of fundamental fairness and the result of overwhelming
evidence.80 Small then entered a conditional guilty plea to violating 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), pending the outcome of appeal, and was sentenced
to eight months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised
release.81
On appeal, the dispositive question for the Third Circuit was not
whether the definition of “any court” in § 922(g)(1) included foreign
courts, because the Third Circuit believed that foreign convictions could
generally be used as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1).82 Instead, the
Third Circuit focused on whether, as a threshold matter, the district court
properly recognized the Japanese conviction as being fundamentally fair

76. United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757 (W.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 425 (3d
Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
77. The Second Circuit did not decide Gayle until after both the district court and the Third
Circuit ruled on Small. See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 89 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Small, 333 F.3d 425, rev’d, 544 U.S. 385.
78. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 759-60 (“We agree with the findings of the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit Courts of Appeals that the phrase ‘any court’ in Section 922 is not ambiguous and includes
foreign courts. Accordingly the rule of lenity is not applicable.”). Compare id., with United States
v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 922 is ambiguous and applying
the rule of lenity to exclude foreign convictions). The rule of lenity is defined as “[t]he judicial
doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or
inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1069 (7th ed. 2000).
79. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
80. Id. at 770. “As the government accurately recites in its brief, the trial record indicates that
the prosecution presented substantial evidence of Small’s guilt.” Id. at 769. “[W]e find based on
our review of the trial record that Small’s Japanese conviction was sufficiently consistent with our
concepts of fundamental fairness and that we may have confidence in the reliability of the factfinding process which led to it.” Id. at 770.
81. Small, 333 F.3d at 426.
82. Id. at 427 n.2. The Third Circuit viewed the parties’s arguments over the definition of
§ 922’s “any court” as a “tempest in a teapot.” Id. The court went on to hold generally that foreign
convictions could be counted as predicate offenses under § 922 for the reasons set forth in United
States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir.
1986). Small, 333 F.3d 427.
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to be used as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1).83 The Third Circuit
upheld the district court’s decision that Small’s conviction was
fundamentally fair as required by the Due Process Clause84 and,
therefore, sufficient to satisfy the predicate offense requirement of
§ 922(g)(1).85 The court also found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
the fundamental fairness of Small’s foreign conviction.86
Small petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court on the issue of whether the term “convicted in any court” in
§ 922(g)(1) includes convictions in foreign courts.87 As grounds for
83. Small, 333 F.3d at 427.
84. Id. at 428. The Due Process Clause provides in relevant part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject to the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
85. Small, 333 F.3d at 428. In finding fundamental fairness, the Third Circuit relied upon the
framework found in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States for
determining when a court may not recognize a foreign conviction. Id. at 427. These guidelines
include the following mandatory and permissive factors:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign
state if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the defendant
in accordance with the law of the rendering state and with the rules set forth in § 421.
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign
state if:
(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to
enable him to defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is
sought;
(e) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition;
or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties to submit the controversy on which the judgment is based to another forum.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 (1987). But
see Aron J. Estaver, Note, Dangerous Criminals or Dangerous Courts: Foreign Felonies as
Predicate Offenses Under Section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 215 (2005) (criticizing the restatement approach due to the potential of inconsistent
results).
86. Small, 333 F.3d at 428.
87. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 2; see supra notes 39-66 for a discussion
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granting certiorari, Small pointed to the conflict among the Circuit
Courts over the proper interpretation of the statute.88 The United States
supported the petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the conflict among
the Circuit Courts and to provide uniform administration of federal
firearms laws.89 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the issue.90
C. Competing Arguments
Small argued that reading § 922(g)(1) to include foreign
convictions is contrary to the plain text of the statute as a whole and
would result in an “anomalous situation where fewer domestic crimes
would be covered than would foreign crimes.”91 Small also argued that
related statutory provisions support reading § 922(g)(1) as excluding
foreign convictions.92 In addition, he argued that policy considerations
indicate that Congress did not intend foreign convictions to be included
as predicate convictions under the statute.93 Further, Small argued that
the statutory history confirmed “any court” meant Federal or State
Court.94 Small concluded that at the very least these considerations
mandated that the rule of lenity apply to exclude foreign convictions.95
The United States argued that the plain meaning of “any court”
includes foreign courts based upon the use of an “all-encompassing and
deliberately inclusive word.”96 The United States also looked at related
statutory provisions as supporting an interpretation that § 922(g)(1)
of the circuit split.
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 4.
89. Brief for the United States for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385
(2005) (No. 03-750), 2004 WL 349912.
90. Small v. United States, 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
91. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Small, 544 U.S. 385 (No. 03-750), 2004 WL 1346664
(discussing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) which defines the term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year” to exclude certain Federal and State anti-trust violations). This exclusion
is silent as to foreign crimes. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
92. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 91, at 23. Small argued specifically that the “Lautenberg
Amendment,” codified at § 922(g)(9), supports a reading of § 922(g)(1) as including only Federal
and State convictions. Id. Section 922(g)(9) makes it a crime for any person “convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm. Id. “Misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence” is defined as “an offense that is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law . . .
.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Small argued that this definition makes it clear that the term
“convicted in any court” means any court in the United States only for purposes of § 922. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note, at 24.
93. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 91, at 26.
94. Id. at 31.
95. Id. at 41.
96. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 10.
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included foreign convictions because in related sections Congress used
more specific language where only Federal and State convictions were
intended.97
The United States also argued including foreign convictions was
necessary to advance the purpose of § 922(g)(1) which was to keep
firearms out of the hands of potentially dangerous persons.98 Further,
the United States argued that Congress intended to take into account the
conduct of persons abroad, which is consistent with considering foreign
convictions under the statute.99
In addressing the potential inconsistencies that could arise under its
proposed interpretation, the United States argued that the limited
exclusion of certain Federal and State anti-trust crimes under the statute
confirmed that the rest of the statute had a larger scope than just Federal
97. Id. at 12-13. The United States pointed to several statutes, including 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(15), which defines a fugitive from justice as “any person who has fled from any State to
avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testimony;” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which excludes
certain “Federal or State offenses” under § 922(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) which defines a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” by referring to “State or Federal law;” and 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2), which defines a “serious drug offense” by reference to particular Federal law or State
law. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 13.
98. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 15-16.
The prohibition of firearms possession by persons who have been convicted of serious
crimes abroad directly advances Congress’s legislative effort to stem the “general
availability [of firearms] to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public
interest” and to keep “these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals . . . and other
persons whose possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow.”
Id. at 17 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824-25 (1974)) (alteration in original).
Id. at 17. The United States also relied on Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103,
116 (1983), which held that a criminal conviction for a felony, whether in a foreign or domestic
court, is a reasonable indication that the person is too much of a risk to be allowed firearm
privileges. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 17.
99. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 18-19. To support this contention, the
United States pointed to § 922(g)(5) and (7) which prohibits illegal aliens, individuals in the United
States on non-immigrant visas, and individuals who have renounced their United States citizenship
from possessing, receiving, or transporting firearms. Id. at 18. The United States also highlighted
repeated references to “foreign commerce” and “importer” within § 922. Id. at 19 n.10. In addition,
the United States argued that Congress’s definition of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22) takes
into consideration conduct of individuals abroad. Id. at 19. The statute provides:
[A]ctivity, directed against the United States, which—
(A) is committed by an individual who is not a national or permanent resident alien of
the United States;
(B) involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life which would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States; and
(C) is intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22).
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and State convictions.100 The United States also argued that more
serious anomalies would result under a reading of the statute that
excluded foreign convictions than would occur under a reading that
included them.101
In addition, the United States argued that earlier versions of gun
control legislation included language referring only to State and Federal
convictions, indicating the amendments excluding this limitation
intended to broaden the scope of the statute.102 The United States also
argued that concern about the potential unfairness of procedures used in
foreign courts was not a sufficient basis to foreclose the use of any
foreign conviction.103
D. United States Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority
The United States Supreme Court held in a five to three decision104
that the phrase “convicted in any court” applied only to domestic and not
foreign convictions.105 The Court reasoned that the word “any” as used
in § 922(g)(1) should not be given the broad scope for which the United
States had argued.106 In considering the scope of the phrase, the Court
100. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 22-23. “That Congress considered it
necessary to restrict the exceptions to ‘Federal’ and ‘State’ offenses therefore confirms rather than
undermines the conclusion that [§] 922(g)(1) starts with an even larger universe of convictions.” Id
at 23. In addition, at the same time § 922(g)(1) was enacted, Congress provided a mechanism
whereby individuals could apply to the Attorney General for relief from the prohibition of
possessing firearms. Id. at 24 n.16. However, since 1992, Congress has forbidden that any funds be
expended to act upon such applications. Id. The United States argued that the fact that this
provision was included is relevant to Congress’s intent in enacting § 922(g)(1) and the subsequent
prohibition on funding is of no consequence to determining whether Congress intended to include
foreign convictions. Id.; see supra note 50 (discussing the status of the waiver of disability under §
922(g)(1)).
101. Brief for the United States, supra note 72, at 26 (“If foreign convictions are entirely
excluded, then those convicted of murder, rape, armed robbery, and terrorism overseas could freely
possess, receive, ship and transport firearms within the United States, while a person convicted of
domestically tampering with a vehicle identification number . . . could be barred for life from
possessing firearms.”).
102. Id. at 29.
103. Id. at 36.
104. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 386 (2005). Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of
the Court in which Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. Justice Thomas
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
took no part in the decision. Id.
105. Id. at 387.
106. Id. at 388.
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pointed out that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic
rather than foreign application.107
The Court was also concerned with the statute allowing as predicate
offenses foreign convictions for conduct that domestic laws would
permit or might punish less severely.108 The Court further reasoned that
it was inconsistent with the statutory text to read the language in a
manner that required consideration of foreign convictions.109 These
concerns led the Court to assume Congress intended a domestic rather
than foreign reach in the term “convicted in any court” unless the
“statutory language, context, history, or purpose” indicated otherwise.110
The Court found no indication in these factors that Congress intended
the phrase “convicted in any court” to include anything other than
domestic convictions.111
2. Dissent
The dissent reasoned that the plain language of § 922(g)(1) includes
foreign convictions because the term “any” has an expansive meaning.112
In addition, by contrasting § 922(g)(1) with other sections of the Gun

107. Id.
108. Id. at 389-90. The Court set forth examples such as Russian laws which criminalized
“Private Entrepreneurial Activity,” Cuban laws which prohibit propaganda, and a Singapore law
punishing acts of vandalism with three years in prison as illustrating the pitfalls of trying to identify
dangerous persons through the use of foreign convictions. Id. at 389.
109. Id.
To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory
definition is not consistent with the statute’s language; it is not easy for those not versed
in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign
court (say of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations.
Id. at 390.
110. Id. “[W]e should apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented
statutes here - an assumption that helps us determine Congress’ intent where Congress did not likely
consider the matter . . . .” Id.
111. Id. at 391-92. The Court looked at the language of the statute and found no language
suggesting anything other than a domestic intention. Id. at 391. The Court considered the
anomalies that could result if the language was read to include foreign convictions such as a person
convicted of domestic anti-trust or regulatory violation being allowed to possess a firearm, while
someone convicted abroad of such a violation being prohibited from possessing a firearm. Id. The
Court also considered the legislative history and found that Congress did not consider whether
foreign convictions were within the scope of the statute. Id. at 390-91. The only indication that the
Court felt supported a reading to include foreign convictions was the purpose of the statute, which is
to keep guns out of the hands of those that may be a threat to society, and a foreign conviction may
identify such an individual. Id. at 393-94. However, the Court felt that this argument was weak due
to the small number of foreign convictions which have been used as a predicate offense. Id. at 394.
112. Small, 544 U.S. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas reasoned that the broad
phrase “any court” was unambiguous. Id. at 397.
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Control Act where State or Federal convictions were specified as
predicate offenses, Justice Thomas reasoned that the context of §
922(g)(1) suggested no geographic limitation.113 Justice Thomas argued
that including foreign convictions under § 922(g)(1) was a practical
means to identify dangerous persons whom Congress intended to include
within the scope of the statute.114 Moreover, Justice Thomas criticized
the Court for creating a new canon of statutory interpretation in its
assumption that, absent a clear statement from Congress, a statute refers
only to domestic matters.115
The dissent had little concern for the potential anomalies pointed to
by the majority, but was concerned with the more dangerous anomalies
that could result from the majority’s interpretation of § 922(g)(1), such
as the fact that those convicted overseas of violent crimes such as
murder, rape, and assault would be permitted to possess a firearm in the
United States.116 Justice Thomas also disagreed with the Court’s
determination that the legislative history was silent.117 Noting that
earlier versions of the bill specified as predicate felonies only State and
Federal convictions, but that this language was subsequently changed in
the final statute to refer to “conviction in any court,” Justice Thomas
argued that the changes indicated an intent of Congress not to limit the
scope of the statute to only domestic convictions.118
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority in Small ignored the plain meaning of the terms of
113. Id.
114. Id. at 398.
115. Id. at 399. Justice Thomas recognized the longstanding canon against extraterritorial
application of federal statutes, but reasoned that it did not apply in this case because in including
foreign convictions under § 922(g)(1) “the Government is enforcing a domestic criminal statute to
punish domestic criminal conduct.” Id. Justice Thomas criticized the use of the cases cited by the
Court as lending no support to “its new assumption” because the cases dealt with the application of
federal statutes outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 399-400.
116. Id. at 405. The dissent called the examples compiled by the Court “a parade of horribles”
and “egregious examples unlikely to correlate with dangerousness.” Id. at 402.
117. Id. at 406. Justice Thomas has often criticized the use of legislative history in interpreting
statutes, and this case was no exception. See infra notes 141-154 for a discussion of the application
of statutory history of § 922(g)(1). Before addressing the majority’s specific arguments based on
the legislative history, Justice Thomas took the opportunity to point out that the “‘task is not the
hopeless one of ascertaining what the legislators who passed the law would have decided had they
reconvened to consider this particular case,’ but the eminently more manageable one of following
the ordinary meaning of the text enacted.” Small, 544 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994)) (alterations omitted).
118. Id. at 401 (“The elimination of the limiting reference suggests that not only federal and
state convictions were meant to be covered.”).
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§ 922(g)(1), misused canons of construction,119 and used less reliable
sources in interpreting this statute.120 In addition, the Court imposed a
burden on Congress to make a clear statement of any intent to use the
conduct of individuals while outside the United States in regulating
activities within the borders of the United States.121 The correct
interpretation of § 922(g)(1), consistent with Congressional intent, is that
the words “convicted in any court” include convictions in foreign
courts.122
A. Plain Meaning Doctrine
The Court held that the broad language of the statute only applied
to domestic convictions.123 More legitimate, however, was the dissent’s
argument that the phrase “convicted in any court” should be given its
natural, expansive meaning.124
The plain meaning doctrine, as
enunciated and followed by countless Supreme Court decisions, dictates
that if the meaning of the statute can be gleaned from the language of the
119. Canons of construction are defined as “rule[s] used in construing legal instruments, esp.
contracts and statutes . . . . Although a few states have codified the canons of construction . . . most
jurisdictions treat the canons as mere customs not having the force of law.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, 163 (7th ed. 2000).
120. See Small, 544 U.S. at 393-94; see also, Lee G. Lester, Note, Small v. United States:
Defining “Any” as a Subset of “Any,” 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 631, 650 (2006) (criticizing the
majority’s rationale as dangerous to the future of Congressional power); infra notes 123-195 and
accompanying text.
121. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see infra notes 164-203 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of the canon against extraterritorial application and the
implications of the majority’s interpretation).
122. See infra notes 123-195 and accompanying text; see also Anthony L. Engel, Note,
Questionable Uses of Canons of Statutory Interpretation: Why the Supreme Court Erred When it
Decided “Any” Only Means “Some,” 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 877, 877 (2006) (criticizing
the Court’s decision as wrongly decided and a departure from the plain meaning of the statute);
Anwar K. Malik, Note, Implications of the Small v. United States Decision, 94 KY. L.J. 715, 716
(2006) (arguing that § 922(g)(1) should include foreign convictions as predicate offenses). But see
Jonathan D. Estreich, Note, “If We Took Congress Seriously, We Would be Worrying All the Time”:
Foreign Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the “Any Court” Language of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g), 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, 74 (2006) (concluding that the Supreme Court correctly decided
Small, despite a reliance on a flawed analysis of the legislative history).
123. Small, 544 U.S. at 394 (majority). The majority relied on various theories to limit § 922.
See supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority opinion; see also
Estaver, supra note 85, at 218 (supporting an interpretation that would limit the scope of the statute
to only domestic convictions). But see Lester, supra note 120, at 646-48 (criticizing the majority
opinion in Small for excluding foreign convictions).
124. Small, 544 U.S. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Lester, supra note 120, at 645
(arguing that the dissent in Small correctly interpreted § 922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions);
Malik, supra note 122, at 721 (arguing that § 922(g)(1) is unambiguous and should be given its
literal meaning, which would include foreign convictions).
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statute itself the court should enforce it according to its plain terms.125
However, this doctrine has at least two exceptions. First, it allows a
court to look to other materials when application of the plain meaning of
the statute in a given case would lead to absurd results.126 Second, it
gives way if application of the plain meaning of the statute would be
inconsistent with the legislative intent or purpose of the statute.127
125. E.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (rejecting an argument that the
conduct for which the defendants had been convicted, although covered by the literal terms of the
statute, should be interpreted against the history and purposes of the statute). The Court pointed out
in Caminetti that there is no duty of interpretation if the language does not admit to more than one
meaning. Id. The plain meaning rule is defined as precluding the use of extrinsic evidence and
limiting the inquiry to the writing itself if the writing appears unambiguous on its face. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 938 (7th ed. 2000); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.153, 194
(1978) (relying on the plain meaning of the Endangered Species Act and reinforcing that if the
meaning of an act is clear and is within the constitutional power of Congress the judicial inquiry
ends with the statute). But see Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)
(finding that the act of the corporation was within the conduct prohibited by the statute, but holding
that although it was “within the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore
cannot be within the statute.”); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (rejecting an argument based upon a literal interpretation of language
contained in Title VII and quoting language from Holy Trinity to support using legislative history to
interpret portions of the statute).
126. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) (applying
the “absurd result” canon to interpret the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) as applied to
civil plaintiffs). The canon against absurdities applies as an exception to the plain meaning rule and
allows the use of materials outside the language of a statute if applying the plain meaning would
lead to absurd results. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 10 (1997). The authors define an absurd result as
one that “would be so illogical or contrary to reason (statutory absurdity) that the application
constructively could not reflect the will of the enacting legislature.” Id. The authors contend that
such a result would be rare. Id.; see also NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (6th ed. 2000) (describing the canon against absurdities as an allowable
departure from the plain meaning of the statute when the literal interpretation would produce an
absurd and unjust result or it is clearly inconsistent with the act’s policy and purpose); Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848-49
(1992) (advocating the use of legislative history to interpret a statute when following the literal
meaning would lead to an absurd result and pointing out that it is the least controversial
circumstance under which a court can look to legislative history).
127. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 10-11. Holy Trinity Church is cited as the seminal
case in using legislative history to determine Congressional intent when faced with an ambiguous
statute. Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in
Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 901 (2000). In Holy Trinity Church, the Court
was called upon to interpret a statute which prohibited the use of aliens to perform labor in the
United States. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 458. The question was whether the statute applied
to an individual who had been a resident of England and moved to the United States after being
hired as a pastor of Holy Trinity Church. Id. The Court found that the letter of the act covered the
conduct in question, but concluded based on a review of the legislative history that Congress did not
intend to cover such conduct in the scope of the statute. Id. at 472. The Court stated that “a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers.” Id. at 459; see Chomsky, supra, at 901 (supporting the Court’s
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The majority misused both exceptions to the plain meaning doctrine
in deciding Small.128 The result is a tortured interpretation of the statute
in which the majority strains to define the word “any” in a limited
manner.129 Had the majority properly used the plain meaning doctrine,
there would have been no need for the court to look to less reliable
sources, such as legislative history, to determine the meaning of the
statute.130
1. Canon Against Absurdities
The majority stopped short of saying that the plain language of the
statute would lead to absurd results, but did give a lengthy analysis of
what it described as “anomalies” that would result by applying the plain
language of the statute.131 One such anomaly is that the plain language
of the statute would exclude certain “Federal or State” antitrust and
business regulatory crimes as predicate offenses, but would leave the

interpretation of the statute and arguing that it validates the practice of using legislative history to
interpret statutes). But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1837-39 (July,
1998) (arguing the legislative history at issue in Holy Trinity did not support the Court’s
interpretation of the statute and proposing a rule that would bar judicial resort to legislative history);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, COMMONLAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 21 (1997) (“Church of the Holy Trinity is cited to us
whenever counsel wants us to ignore the narrow, deadening text of the statute, and pay attention to
the life-giving legislative intent.”).
128. See supra notes 125-127; see also Engel, supra note 122 at 908 (criticizing the departure
from the plain meaning of a statute “in a cases of mere anomaly,” such as Small, because it reduces
both predictability in the legal system and public confidence in judicial decisions).
129. See Small, 544 U.S. at 38. In attempting to limit the definition of the word “any,” the
majority reviewed several cases which limited the plain meaning of this word. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (“‘[A]ny’ can and does mean different things
depending upon the setting.”); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994) (“any”
must be considered within the rest of the statute); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610,
631 (1818) (limiting the word “any” to only those objects to which the legislature intended the
apply). Rather than support the majority’s narrow reading of the word “any,” these cases are more
consistent with the plain reading set forth by the dissent in that the word “any” in § 922 is limited to
the specific phrase “convicted in any court” and fits within the setting and statute as a whole. Small,
544 U.S. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding these limitations, “the word ‘any’ has an
expansive meaning that is one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)) (quotations omitted). The Gonzalez case cited by the
dissent is more on point with Small in the interpretation of the word “any.” Id. Like the use of the
word “any” in § 922(g)(1), the statute in question in Gonzalez contained no “language limiting the
breadth of the word.” See Gonzalez, 520 U.S. at 5.
130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the proper application of the plain
meaning doctrine).
131. Small, 544 U.S. at 391 (majority).
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same class of convictions from a foreign court within the scope of the
statute.132 A similar inconsistency exists with convictions for domestic
violence crimes—the statute forbids those convicted of such a crime
under “Federal or State” law to possess a firearm, but leaves an
individual convicted of such a crime in a foreign court free to possess a
firearm.133 Similar problems are faced with drug convictions, which
allow for a sentence enhancement for certain Federal and State crimes.134
In addition, the statute excludes misdemeanor convictions under state
law with sentences of up to two years.135
The dissent correctly pointed out that the majority could not invoke
the canon against absurdities because the “anomalies” created by the
plain reading of the statute “are, at most, odd” and in some cases “may
even be rational.”136 While conceding the plain meaning could in some
132. Id. The majority was referring to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) which provides an exception
under § 922(g)(1)for those convicted of “Federal or State” antitrust or business regulatory crimes.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (2006). The majority pointed out that an individual convicted of
an antitrust or business regulatory offense in New York would be legally permitted to posses a
firearm, while an individual convicted of a similar offense in Canada would be prohibited under
§ 922(g)(1) from possessing a firearm. Small, 544 U.S. at 391.
133. Id. at 391-92. Section 922(g)(9) provides that a “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” qualifies as a predicate offense. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). A “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” is an offense under “Federal, State or Tribal law.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i).
The majority opined that this created a “senseless distinction between (covered) domestic relations
misdemeanors committed within the United States and (uncovered) domestic relations
misdemeanors committed abroad.” Small, 544 U.S. at 392.
134. Small, 544 U.S. at 392. The majority was referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) which
provides for a sentence enhancement under § 922(g)(1) if the individual has three or more predicate
convictions for a “serious drug offense,” which is defined as an “offense under State law.” 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006); see also supra note 56 for a discussion of the application of § 924(e) in
the Concha case.
135. Small, 544 U.S. at 392. The majority reasoned that this exception presumed those
convicted of this class of misdemeanor crimes were less dangerous than those convicted of felonies.
Id. The result of this exception would be to allow those convicted in the United States of such an
offense to possess a firearm, while an individual convicted in a foreign court of such an offense
would be prohibited from doing so. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
136. Small, 544 U.S. at 404. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas referred to the majority’s
application of the canon against absurdities as a “mutant version of a recognized canon.” Id. The
dissent cited cases which illustrate the standard to be applied when invoking the canon against
absurdities. Id. (citing Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Sturges v. Crownshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819)). In Public Citizen v.
Department of Justice, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the canon should be invoked where it is
impossible that Congress intended the result and “where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be
obvious to most anyone. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 471. In Sturges v. Crownshield, the Court
stated:
[T]he plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same
instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could
not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying
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situations bring about inconsistent results, the dissent argued that more
dangerous anomalies would result from the majority’s interpretation,
such as an individual with a foreign conviction for murder being able to
possess a firearm in the United States.137 Such results strongly favor a
plain reading of the statute rather than the narrow interpretation set forth
by the majority.138
Despite the fact that these “anomalies” were insufficient to invoke
the canon against absurdities, the majority nevertheless used this as a
basis to look past the plain meaning of the statute.139 Abandoning this
standard gives the judiciary the opportunity to ignore statutory language
and look to less reliable sources to define the meaning of statutes.140
2. Legislative History
In finding the plain meaning of the statute to be unclear, the
majority looked to the legislative history of the statute to determine the
Congressional intent regarding the inclusion of foreign convictions.141
The Court’s analysis of the history of § 922(g)(1) reflects the limitations
inherent in using legislative history to interpret statutes in order to
the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without
hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 202-03.
137. Small, 544 U.S. at 405 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas pointed out that the
majority’s interpretation allowed “those convicted of overseas of murder, rape, assault, kidnapping,
terrorism and other dangerous crimes to possess firearms freely in the United States . . .
[m]eanwhile, a person convicted domestically of tampering with a vehicle identification number, 18
U.S.C. § 511(a)(1) (2006), is barred from possessing firearms.” Id.
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also Robert A. Bracken, Foreign
Convictions are not Proper Predicate Offenses Under the Statutory Language “Convicted in Any
Court”: Small v. United States, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 383, 396 (2006) (criticizing the majority’s
argument that a plain reading of the statute produces anomalies and supporting the dissent’s view
that far more dangerous anomalies are created by the majority’s narrow reading of the statute).
139. Small, 544 U.S. at 391-92.
140. See infra note 142 (discussing the limitation on the uses of legislative history).
141. Small, 544 U.S. at 393. Those that argue against using legislative history as a means of
interpreting statutes are known as “textualists.” Vermeule, supra note 127, at 1833. Those that are
willing to consult legislative history in interpreting statutes are known as intentionalists or
purposivists. Id. at 1834; see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76 (2006) (distinguishing these two theories on the basis of how each
theory emphasizes context, with textualists using semantic context and purposivists using policy
context); J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray,
53 SMU L. REV. 81, 83 (2000) (dividing the various theories of statutory interpretation into four
categories on the basis of each theory’s reliance on non-textual sources). The four categories used
by Kelso and Kelso are Formalism, Holemsian, Natural Law, and Instrumental theories. Id. at 83.
The authors identify Justice Thomas as following the Formalism approach which rejects the use of
legislative history. Id. at 85-86. Justice Breyer, on the other hand, is classified as following the
Natural Law Theory which looks to legislative history to determine Congressional intent. Id. at 88.
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determine legislative intent.142
142. There are several limitations to using legislative history over the text of a statute. One
criticism is that legislative history is incomplete due to undocumented steps in the legislative
process such as discussions in a political party caucus or conferences with a legislative leader.
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 28. In addition, as the use of legislative history has become
more prevalent in judicial decisions, the legislative record has become corrupted by statements
which are planted in the legislative history with the sole purpose of influencing subsequent judicial
interpretation. Id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the Federalist
but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302-03 (1998) (addressing
the problem of strategic use of legislative history and suggesting that a rule of total exclusion may
be the only way to eliminate this practice). Another criticism centers on the role of compromise in
passing legislation. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 33. The result of legislative compromise is
that the intent of one legislator in passing a particular act is not necessarily the intent of another. Id.
at 33. Eskridge also points out that the use of legislative history has caused inefficiencies for
Congress and practitioners because legislators attempt to put as much information as possible in the
legislative history, which results in practitioners having to spend time researching it. Eskridge,
supra, at 1303. In addition to the limitations inherent in using legislative history, textualists also
argue that consulting legislative history is unconstitutional because it violates bicameralism and
presentment requirements to pass a statute. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 33; see also U.S.
CONST. ART. I § 7. A second constitutional argument is that unelected individuals such as staff and
lobbyists contribute to statutory history, and using this history as a source of interpreting law results
in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Breyer, supra note 126, at 862-63.
Justice Scalia has been a vocal critic over the use of legislative history because in his view
the “objective indication of the words” of the statute passed by the legislature determines what the
law is, not the legislative intent as inferred from legislative history. Scalia, supra note 127, at 2931. As such, Scalia argues that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative source in
determining the meaning of a statute. Id. at 29-30. Scalia offers several arguments to support his
rejection of legislative history. See id. at 31-35. One argument is that the use of history has resulted
in “a legal culture in which lawyers routinely . . . make no distinction between words in the text of
the statute and words in its legislative history.” Id. at 31. He also believes that using legislative
history is more likely to produce a “false or contrived legislative intent” rather than accurately
portray the intent of the majority of the legislature that passed the law. Id. at 32. He argues that in
most cases no legislative intent exists because Congress is concerned with the larger issues and not
the detailed points that reach the courts for interpretation. Id. Scalia also points out that the
information contained in floor debates and committee reports are not the views of a majority of
Congress and in some instances are simply language which has been written by lawyer-lobbyists for
insertion into the statutory history, which makes them an unacceptable source of reference. Id. at
32-34. In addition, Scalia contends that using committee reports to interpret a statute is improper
because the Constitution vests legislative power in the House and Senate, not in committees. Id. at
35. He is also concerned with the ease in which a judge can use or dismiss a piece of legislative
history due to a lack of rules governing the weight to be given to particular pieces of the history,
which he argues allows a “willful judge” to manipulate the history to support their viewpoint. Id. at
36. In his view, the use of legislative history to determine legislative intent has resulted in judicial
decisions based on a court’s policy preference rather than the law. Id. at 35.
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, supports the use of legislative history to interpret
statutes. Breyer, supra note 126, at 847. Justice Breyer identifies five situations in which courts
should consult legislative history when interpreting a statute. Id. at 860-61. These include: “(1)
avoiding an absurd result; (2) preventing the law from turning on a drafting error; (3) understanding
the meaning of specialized terms; (4) understanding the ‘reasonable purpose’ a provision might
serve; and (5) choosing among several possible ‘reasonable purposes’ for language in a politically
controversial law.” Id. at 860. In Justice Breyer’s opinion, “[t]he ‘problem’ of legislative history is
its ‘abuse,’ not its ‘use.’” Id. at 874.
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The Court stated that the history of § 922(g)(1) is silent as to
whether foreign convictions were intended to be included in the scope of
the statute and initially referred to this legislative silence as a “neutral
factor” in their analysis.143 However, the Court used this “neutral factor”
Concerns over the use of statutory history have been the subject of debate for many years.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing Holy Trinity Church). Justice Robert H.
Jackson raised concerns over his own use of legislative history in an address to the American Law
Institute meeting on Federal Rules Decisions in 1948. Honorable Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson,
Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 124 (1948).
I, like other opinion writers, have resorted not infrequently to legislative history as a
guide to the meaning of statutes. I am coming to think it is a badly overdone practice, of
dubious help to true interpretation and one which poses serious practical problems for a
large part of the legal profession. The British courts, with their long accumulation of
experience, consider Parliamentary proceedings too treacherous a ground for
interpretation of statutes and refuse to go back of an Act itself to search for unenacted
meanings. They thus follow Mr. Justice Holmes’ statement, made, however, before he
joined the Supreme Court, that “We do not inquire what the legislature meant, we ask
only what the statute means.”
And, after all, should a statute mean to a court what was in the minds but not put into
words of men behind it, or should it mean what its language reasonably conveys to those
who are expected to obey it?
Id.
143. Small, 544 U.S. at 393. The majority did reference a Senate bill which contained
language that would have restricted predicate crimes to domestic offenses. Id. This bill was
ultimately rejected by the Conference Committee, and the language “convicted in any court” was
adopted in the final version. Id. The majority opined that this change did not reflect the intent of
the drafters. Id. But see Scalia, supra note 127, at 32 (criticizing the use of committee reports in
construing legislative history).
The use of legislative silence to infer intent has been referred to as the theory of the “dog
that didn’t bark” and as the “Canon of Canine Silence.” See Church of Scientology v. I.R.S., 484
U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987) (reasoning that if Congress intended to amend the purpose of a draft bill in a
significant way there would have been reference to this change in the legislative history). The court
opined that:
All in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle’s “dog that didn’t bark,” that an amendment having the effect petitioner
ascribes to it would have been differently described by its sponsor and not nearly as
readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill.
Id. The Court was referencing a Sherlock Holmes tale in which Holmes is investigating the
disappearance of a racehorse Silver Blaze. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the
Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX L. REV. 339, 387 n. 236 (2005) (citing ARTHUR
CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 336, 346-47 (Doubleday 1930)
(1894)). In his investigation, Holmes learns that the horse was being guarded by a dog at the time
of the disappearance, yet the dog did not bark the night the horse went missing. Id. In other words,
there was significance to the dog’s silence because he did not bark when one would assume he
would have. Id; see also SINGER, supra note 126, at § 45:12 (describing this canon of statutory
interpretation as one in which courts should not presume that the legislature intended to “overthrow
long-established principles of law” unless they clearly express their intention to do so). But see
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73-74 (2004) ( Scalia, J. dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s use of the “Canon of Canine Silence,” which in his opinion allows courts
to ignore the words of the statute on the basis of a lack of legislative history).
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in a manner that was anything but neutral by relying on it to support the
conclusion that the language “convicted in any court” applies only to
domestic convictions.144
The dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on the legislative
silence145 and countered that the history was not as silent as the majority
contended.146 The dissent pointed to the specification of particular
“Federal or State offenses” and crimes of domestic violence as an
indication that Congress limited certain predicate crimes by jurisdiction
when it felt it was necessary.147 Justice Thomas also pointed out that the
144. Small, 544 U.S. at 394; see supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the theory
of the “dog that didn’t bark”).
145. Small, 544 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent was critical of using even
explicit statements in statutory history to aid in interpreting the statute and found the majority’s
reliance on the silence of the statutory history to be even more troubling than using explicit
statements. Id. Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia are known as strict textualists in interpreting
statutes. See supra note 141 and accompanying text discussing the distinctions between textualists
and intentionalists, or purposivists. Justice Scalia has argued vigorously against using legislative
history to interpret statutes. See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on
Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 369
(arguing that Scalia’s criticism of the use of legislative history has been a factor in the decline in its
use by the Supreme Court since his appointment in 1987). Koby’s article provides an example of
Scalia’s criticism of legislative history contained in his concurring opinion in Blanchard v.
Bergeron:
That the Court should refer to the citation of three District Court cases in a document
issued by a single committee of a single house as the action of Congress displays the
level of unreality that our unrestrained use legislative history has attained . . . . [A]nyone
familiar with modern-day drafting of a congressional committee report is well aware, the
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her
own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyerlobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the Members
of Congress what the bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction. What a
heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation of obscure
district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be
observed by the Supreme Court itself.
Koby, supra, at 377-78 (quoting Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
Likewise, Justice Thomas focuses on the text of a statute and rejects the use of legislative
history unless the “text is so ambiguous that Congress likely had no intent regarding the matter.”
Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging Contours of Justice Thomas’s Textualism, 12 REGENT U.
L. REV. 365, 375 (1999-2000). However, Justice Thomas has been willing to consider legislative
history in limited circumstances as opposed to Justice Scalia’s complete rejection of its use. Id; see
also Eskridge, supra note 142, at 1307 (pointing out that Justice Thomas “often but not always
joined Scalia’s attacks on statutory legislative history.”).
146. Small, 544 U.S. at 406-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Note that the majority refers to the
statute’s “lengthy legislative history,” while the dissent refers only to one piece of the history, part
of which is reflected in the text of the statute, the other portion in a previous version of the bill. Id.
at 406. In addition, this discussion is prefaced by Justice Thomas stating, “Reliance on explicit
statements in the history . . . would be problematic enough.” Id.
147. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006) (exempting Federal or State anti-trust violations);
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legislative history included a version of the bill that limited convictions
to “Federal” and “State” convictions, yet the final bill adopted did not
contain this limitation.148
Although the legislative history did not contain an explicit
statement regarding the inclusion or exclusion of foreign convictions, it
is clear that a more expansive definition of “any court” was chosen over
a definition limited to only Federal and State convictions.149 The
majority misused statutory history in its analysis by ignoring relevant
history that sheds light on the intended meaning of the statute.150
After ignoring relevant history, the Court further misused
legislative history by inferring from this “silence” that Congress must
not have intended the use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses.151
This assumption is flawed for two reasons. First, it is assumes that every
step in the creation of a law will be contained in the legislative
history.152 Second, even statutory history that speaks explicitly to a
particular issue is not necessarily a reliable indicator of Congressional
intent,153 making a silent history an even less reliable indicator of
intent.154
3. Legislative Purpose
The purpose of the Gun Control Act is to reduce violent crime by
outlawing the possession of firearms by persons that Congress deemed

Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (defining certain misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence covered under the
statute).
148. Small, 544 U.S. at 406-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. Compare S. Rep. No. 1501, at 31 (1968) (defining predicate crimes as in terms of
“Federal” or “State” convictions), with H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29
(1968) (adopting language “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year). For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Gun Control Act see
Estreich, supra note 122.
150. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text (discussing the application of legislative
history in the Small case); see also Bracken supra note 138, at 397 (concluding that the legislative
history supports the inclusion of foreign convictions).
151. Small, 544 U.S. at 394; see supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
legislative silence in interpreting statutes).
152. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of referring to
legislative history).
153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Scalia, supra note 127, at 17 (“[I]t is
simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver
promulgated.”).
154. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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to be dangerous.155 Congress used prior convictions for serious crimes
as an indicator of whether a person was dangerous and should be
prohibited from possessing a firearm.156 The majority conceded that this
purpose,157 which was clearly set out in the original enactment of the
Gun Control Act, did offer support for interpreting “any court” to
include foreign convictions.158 However, the majority chose to ignore
this express piece of legislative history and instead used the less reliable
and more speculative legislative silence to reach a conclusion contrary to
the statute’s stated purpose.159
Although the legislative history does not explicitly address foreign
convictions,160 not including foreign convictions as predicate offenses
under the statute results in an application that is inconsistent with the
statutory purpose.161 This interpretation allows an individual convicted
of a dangerous crime abroad such as rape or murder to possess a firearm

155. Congress made the following findings and declarations in passing the Gun Control Act:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares—
(1) that there is a widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, and that the existing Federal controls over such traffic do
not adequately enable the States to control this traffic within their own borders through
the exercise of their police power;
(2) that the ease with which any person can acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun
(including criminals, juveniles, narcotics addicts, mental defectives, armed groups who
would supplant the functions of duly constituted public authorities, and others whose
possession of such weapons is similarly contrary to the public interest) is a significant
factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States . . . .
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 901, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 225
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(2006)); see also supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the history and background of the Gun Control Act).
Initially, there was some question as to whether simple possession of a firearm by a felon
was prohibited under the statute. See Vizzard, supra note 1, at 88. The Supreme Court first held in
United States v. Bass that in prosecuting such an offense the government had to show that the
possession was “in commerce or affecting commerce.” 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971). Later the Court
held that the nexus between the possession and the element of “in or affecting commerce” was
minimal, with prior movement in interstate commerce satisfying this requirement. Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563, 578 (1977).
156. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the findings and declarations in
passing the Gun Control Act).
157. Note that courts may use “legislative intent” and “legislative purpose” interchangeably to
refer to statutory meaning. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 8.
158. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 393 (2005) (“Congress sought to ‘keep guns out of
the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without
becoming a threat to society.’” (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc. 460 U.S. 103, 122
(1983))).
159. Id. at 394.
160. See supra notes 141-154 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose of the Gun
Control Act).
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in the United States, while an individual convicted of any felony
domestically, regardless of whether it is a crime of violence, would be
prohibited from possessing a firearm.162 Rather than addressing this
inconsistency, the majority dismisses it on the grounds that foreign
convictions have rarely been used as predicate offenses in felon-inpossession prosecutions.163 The fact that foreign convictions are rarely
used as predicate offenses does not support a finding inconsistent with
the statutory purpose of § 922(g)(1).
B. Assumption of Domestically Oriented Statutes
1. The Reach of Domestic Statutes
While conceding that the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of laws did not directly apply to the facts of this case,164 the
majority nonetheless invoked this canon by analogy to argue against the
use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1).165
162. Small, 544 U.S. at 405 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority’s
interpretation allows those convicted of murder, rape, assault, kidnapping, and terrorism in other
countries to possess firearms freely in this country); see also Bracken, supra note 138, at 398
(finding the purpose of the statute is unambiguously to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous
individuals whether convicted domestically or abroad); Basler, supra note 42, at 182 (analyzing the
circuit split and arguing that individuals with foreign convictions are equally as dangerous as those
with domestic convictions); Lester, supra note 120, at 655 (arguing that not including foreign
convictions under § 922 frustrates the purpose of the statute to prevent gun abuse); Dionna K.
Taylor, Comment, The Tempest in a Teapot: Foreign Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the
Federal Felon in Possession Statute [United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003)], 43
WASHBURN L.J. 763, 787 (2004) (concluding that the exclusion of foreign convictions as predicate
offenses under § 922 would lead to absurd results). But see Estaver, supra note 85, at 232 (arguing
that the purpose of the Gun Control Act only includes foreign convictions “[i]f read at its broadest
level of abstraction”).
163. Small, 544 U.S. at 394.
164. Small, 544 U.S. at 389.
165. Id. The canon against extraterritorial application is described as a “longstanding principle
of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’’’ William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998) (quoting EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). In his article, Professor Dodge presents what the
canon of extraterritorial application means using the views of three scholars - Justice Holmes, Judge
Bork and Judge Mikva. Id. at 88-89. Under Justice Holmes’ view, the presumption is “that acts of
Congress apply only to conduct within the United States and not to conduct abroad even if that
conduct causes effects in the United States.” Id. at 89. Judge Bork’s view is “that acts of Congress
should apply only to conduct that has effects within the United States.” Id. at 89-90. He describes
Judge Mikva’s view as one considering that “acts of Congress apply to conduct that occurs within
or has effects within the United States.” Id. at 90. Professor Dodge favors Judge Bork’s view and
argues that the only legitimate basis for the presumption against extraterritoriality is the
presumption that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind. Id. at 90. Section
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One indication of the majority’s flawed reasoning is that the cases it
relies upon in applying the presumption against extraterritorial
application to § 922(g)(1) do not involve the use of foreign judgments in
domestic courts, but instead deal with the application of domestic laws
to regulate conduct outside the borders of the United States.166 These
cases illustrate the correct application of this presumption, which is to
generally limit the application of laws to within the geographic borders
of the United States.167
The canon against extraterritorial application is not relevant where
a statute seeks to regulate conduct domestically.168 Applying this
doctrine in Small is incorrect because § 922(g)(1) does not seek to
regulate conduct outside of the United States.169 Section 922(g)(1) and
Gary Small’s prosecution in particular are directed at conduct within the
United States, specifically gun possession by dangerous individuals in
this country.170 Allowing the use of a foreign conviction as a predicate
offense does not change the reach of the statute from domestic to
922(g)(1) does not fit under any of the three approaches to the use of the canon against
extraterritorial application set forth by Professor Dodge because both the conduct and effects of the
conduct at issue in Small occur within the territory of the United States. Id. 89-90. The majority
correctly points out that the presumption would apply if the Court were to consider whether the
statute applied to gun possession in a foreign country. Small, 125 U.S. at 389. Despite the
presumption being inapplicable, the majority believed “a similar assumption” was appropriate in
interpreting § 922(g)(1). Id.
166. Small, 544 U.S. at 389; see Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993) (holding
that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply to a tort claim arising from conduct in Antarctica in
part based the presumption against extraterritorial application); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
250-51 (1991) (holding that Title VII did not apply to a United States citizen working outside of the
United States); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (holding that the Eight Hour
Law did not apply to work in foreign countries).
167. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In each of the cases cited by the majority
to support its use of the presumption against extraterritorial application, the conduct being regulated
by the statutes in question occurred outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. See supra
note 166 (setting forth the holdings for the cases cited by the majority). In Smith, the plaintiff
sought to have the Federal Torts Claims Act apply to a negligence claim against the United States
for the death of her husband while he was employed by a construction company in Antarctica. 507
U.S. at 199. In Foley, the Plaintiff sought to have the Federal Eight Hour law apply to work that he
performed for his employer in Iraq and Iran. 336 U.S. at 283. In Arabian American Oil Co., the
Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII against his employer, an American company, for
discrimination which he claimed occurred while working in Saudi Arabia. 499 U.S. at 247. As
these cases illustrate, the precedent for applying the presumption against extraterritorial application
is where the conduct or effect of the conduct is outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the use of this presumption for a statute that
applies to domestic conduct is unprecedented. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006); see also Engel, supra note 122, at 905 (arguing the
majority’s use of the canon against extraterritorial application is inconsistent with precedent).
170. See Small, 544 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
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foreign.171
In an attempt to cure this defect in rationale, the majority turned
their argument to the difference between convictions obtained in
domestic and foreign courts.172 While there are legitimate concerns with
using a foreign conviction as a predicate offense,173 these concerns do
not change the fact that § 922(g)(1) is a domestic statute that is being
applied domestically.174 As such, the canon of construction against
extraterritorial application has no use in this case.175
In a further attempt to justify the use of the canon against
extraterritorial application, the majority forms a new canon out of the
“ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented
statutes.”176 This assumption in the past has been used to justify the use
171. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
172. Small, 544 U.S. at 389-90
173. See infra notes 179-195 and accompanying text (discussing the application of § 922(g)(1)
to foreign convictions). The district courts also explored the potential problems in using a
conviction from a court which may not have the same due process requirements and evidentiary
standards. See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95 (2003) (questioning whether Congress
intended to include foreign convictions in the absence of any discussion of whether to include
convictions of courts not meeting what would be considered the minimum standards of justice in the
United States); United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing concerns over
the potential lack of constitutional protections in foreign convictions as reason to exclude them as
predicate offenses under the statute). But see United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir.
1989) (concluding that a predicate conviction from England was proper under the statute because of
the similarities between the justice systems of England and the United States); United States v.
Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757-58 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no showing that convictions
obtained in Argentina and Switzerland violated the defendant’s constitutional rights).
174. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text (discussing the proper use of the canon
against extraterritorial application).
175. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
176. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the “ordinary assumption
about the reach of domestically oriented statutes” as an invention of the majority derived from the
longstanding principle against extraterritorial application (quoting Small, 544 U.S. at 390
(majority))); see also Malik, supra note 122, at 728 (pointing out that the new canon may affect the
interpretation of other statutes which contain “convicted in any court” language). But see Bracken
supra note 138, at 396 (supporting the creation of this new canon for providing notice to Congress
to legislate with more specificity).
See also Dodge, supra note 165, at 90. Professor Dodge presents six reasons given to
support the application against extraterritoriality. Id. He lists the five justifications given by
Professor Bradley, which include:
(1) international law limitations on extraterritoriality, which Congress should be assumed
to have observed; (2) consistency with domestic conflict-of-laws rules; (3) the need “to
protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord;” (4) “the commonsense notion that Congress
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind” and (5) separation-of-powers
concerns—i.e. “that the determination of whether and how to apply federal legislation to
conduct abroad raises difficult and sensitive policy questions that tend to fall outside
both the institutional competence and constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary.”

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 5
SCHULDFINAL.DOC

782

5/14/2007 12:49:31 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:751

of the canon against extraterritorial application, but has not itself been
used as a canon of construction.177 In essence, the majority creates a
new canon and seeks to legitimize this creation by using justifications
from a long held canon of construction which has no application to the
facts of this case.178
2. Application of § 922(g)(1) to Foreign Convictions
The majority raised several concerns over the use of foreign
convictions as predicate offenses.179 One issue was the use of a foreign
conviction where that conviction was for conduct prohibited in the
foreign country, but legal in the United States.180 The majority was also
concerned about the procedures under which foreign convictions might
be obtained and whether those procedures would be consistent with
American standards of due process and fundamental fairness.181
Id. (footnotes omitted). He also looked at a sixth justification given by Professor Eskridge, which is
“that it provides legislators with a clear background rule which allows them to predict the
application of their statutes.” Id.
177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 164-177 and accompanying text.
179. Small, 544 U.S. at 390. But see Basler, supra note 42, at 180 (arguing that concerns over
an unconstitutional conviction being used as a predicate offense “should not be a matter of
controversy” because the writ of habeas corpus could effectively deal with such a claim).
180. Small, 544 U.S. at 391.
181. Id. at 389. The Supreme Court did not specifically address the fundamental fairness of
Small’s Japanese conviction. However, the issue was addressed by the district court and the Third
Circuit, with both courts finding that the Japanese conviction met United States standards of
fundamental fairness. United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385
(2005). However, Small did point to many procedural issues present in his Japanese conviction that
would be contrary to procedural protections he would have received in an American court. United
States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 765-66 (W.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 425, rev’d, 544 U.S.
385. For example, he was denied bail, interrogated for 25 days, denied the right to a jury trial,
denied the right to effective counsel at stages in his proceedings, denied the right to an appeal, and
was denied the right to remain silent. Id. at 766. However, relying on the transcript from the
Japanese trial and the similarities between the rights protected under both the Japanese Constitution
and United States Constitution, the district court found that the defects Small complained of did not
render the conviction fundamentally unfair. Id. at 765-70. The Third Circuit applied the standards
set forth in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW to find that Small’s Japanese
conviction comported with United States standards of fundamental fairness. Small, 333 F.3d at 428;
see also supra note 85 (setting forth the Restatement approach to determining the fundamental
fairness of a foreign conviction); Estreich, supra note 122, at 87-88 (arguing the use of foreign
convictions as predicate offenses is “constitutionally suspect”). But see Taylor, supra note 162, at
789 (recognizing potential due process concerns in using foreign convictions, but arguing that the
issues could be adequately addressed at the trial level by determining whether a foreign conviction
meets constitutional standards); Engel, supra note 122, at 897-98 (stating that the trial court could
make a determination as to the fairness of the underlying foreign conviction).
There are significant procedural differences between the United States and Japanese legal
systems. See David T. Johnson, American Law in Japanese Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
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Furthermore, differences in criminal sentences in foreign countries also
presented a problem as some conduct may be punished more harshly
under a foreign legal system, which would make the standard of “crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” a less
reliable indicator of the dangerousness of an individual.182
While potentially important, the concerns raised by the majority
over differences between foreign and domestic convictions do not justify
limiting § 922(g)(1) to only domestic convictions.183 The result of this
limitation is to allow dangerous individuals to possess firearms, which is
contrary to the intent and purpose of the Gun Control Act.184 Rather
than completely eliminating foreign convictions as predicate offenses,
the majority could have addressed its concerns by limiting the use of
foreign convictions under § 922(g)(1) to only those convictions that are
consistent with laws of the United States and comply with American

771, 779 (2003) (discussing the prohibition on plea bargaining in criminal cases under Japanese law
and the use of coercive means to obtain confessions such as prolonged interrogations without
counsel and the denial of bail for the majority of defendants that do not confess); see also Crane
Stephen Landis, Comment, Human Rights Violations in Japan: A Contemporary Survey, 5 J. INT’L
L. & PRAC. 53, 56-59 (2006) (examining the Japanese legal system in light of international human
rights laws and pointing out the practices under this system of coerced confessions, incidents of
police brutality and limited access to counsel); David A. Suess, Note, Paternalism Versus
Pugnacity: The Right to Counsel In Japan and the United States, 72 IND. L.J. 291, 291 (1996)
(comparing the right to counsel under both the Japanese and American legal system and arguing that
despite sharing similar constitutions, the two systems interpret them in different ways). But see
Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317,
317-19 (1992) (describing the Japanese legal system as highly efficient, giving lenient criminal
sentences, and with a strong focus on rehabilitation and reintegration of suspects). In addition, the
United States criminal justice system is not without its critics. See David Cole, As Freedom
Advances: The Paradox of Severity in American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 455-57
(2001) (describing the United States as “leader of the ‘free world’ and of the incarcerated world,”
and arguing that the criminal justice system discriminates against minorities); Terry D. Johnson,
Note, Unbridled Discretion and Color Consciousness: Violating International Human Rights in the
United States Criminal Justice System, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 231, 233 (2004) (arguing that
discrimination against blacks in the United States criminal justice system violates the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination). A comparison of these two
systems of law illustrates the difficulties in reconciling convictions under two different complex
legal systems and the need for a standard which will apply United States standards of due process.
182. Small, 544 U.S. at 390. But see Alex Glashausser, Note, The Treatment of Foreign
Country Convictions as Predicates for Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE
L.J. 134, 156-57 (1994) (arguing that the fact that an individual commits crimes in two countries is
a strong indication of individual fault on the part of the offender, rather than the environment).
183. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing how the various circuit courts
addressed the due process concerns of using foreign convictions); supra note 181 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedural difficulties in determining whether a foreign
conviction meets the standards of fundamental fairness).
184. See supra notes 137 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers posed by the
majority’s interpretation).
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standards of due process and fundamental fairness.185
The Restatement standard used by the Third Circuit186 would
provide such a framework because it requires a judgment to be rendered
under a system that provides “impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with due process of law.”187 In addition, it provides the court
with several discretionary factors which would provide additional
protection to defendants, while preventing the potential unjust results
pointed out by the majority.188 This limitation would lessen the concerns
over the use of foreign convictions and provide workable guidelines to
courts.189 It would also prevent the dangerous result that occurs under
the majority’s application, which allows clearly dangerous individuals
the opportunity to possess a firearm.190
The Supreme Court has previously shown disfavor for allowing a
defendant to collaterally attack predicate convictions under other
provisions of the Gun Control Act.191 The Court has pointed to a need to
promote finality in judgments and to the administrative difficulties of
reviewing predicate offenses at the trial level.192 However, these

185. See Taylor, supra note 162, at 789 (advocating a case by case approach in which the
validity of a foreign conviction as a predicate offense would be determined at the trial level); Engel,
supra note 122, at 897-98 (arguing that the Court’s fairness concerns were overstated and could be
addressed by a trial court determination of whether a foreign conviction meets American standards
of legality). But see Estaver, supra note 85, at 242 (arguing that a case by case approach would lead
to inconsistent rulings as to when a foreign conviction would be recognized by a court as a predicate
offense); Glashausser supra note 182, at 161-62 (arguing for the use of a “reliability of conviction”
standard rather than the fundamental fairness standard).
186. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s application
of the Restatement standards to Small’s Japanese conviction).
187. See Taylor, supra note 162, at 793 (supporting the Restatement approach to determine the
constitutionality of foreign predicate convictions). But see Estaver, supra note 85, at 242
(criticizing the Restatement approach because of the likelihood that it will yield inconsistent
recognition of foreign predicate convictions).
188. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Small, 333 F.3d
425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
189. See supra notes 173-188 and accompanying text. But see Estreich, supra note 122, at 89
(arguing the Restatement approach is “not feasible because trial courts are neither willing nor able
to research the particular facts of the conviction, survey a foreign system of justice and calculate the
fairness of a foreign system”).
190. See supra notes 173-188 and accompanying text.
191. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (holding that defendants cannot use the federal
sentencing forum to attack the validity of predicate offenses used to enhance a sentence under
§ 924(e) of the Gun Control Act). Section 924(e) provides for enhanced sentences for convictions
under § 922(g)(1) where the defendant has three or more prior convictions for violent felony or
serious drug offenses. Id. at 490; see also Glashausser, supra note 182, at 137 (arguing that foreign
convictions should be used as predicate offenses for sentence enhancements under recidivist
statutes).
192. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496-97.
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policies do not support a similar ban on attacking the validity of
predicate foreign convictions.193 Reviewing a foreign conviction does
not “undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures,” nor does
it “delay and impair the orderly administration of justice” as occurs in
the review of domestic convictions.194 In addition, the need to review
the validity of foreign convictions as predicate offenses would be a
relatively infrequent occurrence, which reduces the concern over
administrative difficulties.195
C. Looking Forward
1. Impact on Legislation
In response to the Small decision, the House and Senate have
proposed amendments to modify the language of § 922(g)(1) to
explicitly include foreign convictions.196 If such an amendment was
passed it would correct the misinterpretation of this statute by the
Court.197 However, it is unclear at this time whether any proposed
amendment will be passed.198
Whether or not § 922(g)(1) is amended, it will not correct the
additional burden that the Court has placed on Congress.199 This
additional burden is an onerous level of specificity required of Congress
to include reference to any potential foreign issues that may arise when
drafting legislation that applies to domestic conduct.200 This clear
193. See, e.g., Glashausser, supra note 182, at 156-59 (arguing that failing to include foreign
convictions as predicate offenses under recidivist statutes is contrary to the policies supporting such
laws).
194. Custis, 511 U.S. at 497 (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11
(1979)).
195. See id. at 497; see also Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005) (pointing out the
relative infrequency that foreign convictions are used as the predicate offense under § 922(g)(1)).
196. S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1168, 110th Cong. (2007).
197. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for the wording of these proposed amendments.
198. See William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (concluding that Congressional overrides of Supreme Court
statutory interpretation cases “are most likely when a Supreme Court interpretation reveals an
ideologically fragmented Court, relies on the text’s plain meaning and ignores legislative signals,
and/or rejects positions taken by federal, state, or local governments.”). These factors are present in
Small, making it a more likely candidate for Congressional override. But see Michael E. Solimine
& James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory
Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 452-53 (1992) (studying the response of Congress to the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of federal statutes and concluding that in most cases Congress does not
override decisions of the Court).
199. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. Id. The dissent criticized the majority’s interpretation as “impos[ing] a clear statement
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statement requirement is unnecessary where Congress seeks to regulate
conduct domestically.201
The impact on future legislation will depend on whether Congress
will take this burden into consideration when drafting legislation.202 If
Congress does heed this explicit statement requirement, it could make it
more complicated to draft and pass legislation, but if it ignores this
requirement, Congress runs the risk of creating legislative loopholes for
criminals.203
2. Impact on Cases
A review of cases citing Small v. United States indicates that the
decision is being cited for a variety of reasons.204 Several decisions,
including two Supreme Court decisions, have used the same reasoning
rule on Congress: Absent a clear statement, a statute refers to nothing outside the United States.”
Id.; see also supra notes 164-178 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 164-195 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional reaction to
this decision).
203. Small, 125 U.S. at 1761. As Justice Thomas pointed out, the majority decision, requiring
specific reference by Congress to foreign facts in order to give a statute plain meaning, will demand
a high level of specificity in drafting legislation. Id.
204. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 458 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (citing his dissent in Small as it related to criticism of the use of
legislative silence to infer intent); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 372 (2005) (citing
Small for the proposition that Congress legislates with domestic concerns in mind); Spector v.
Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 146 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (citing his criticism of the majority’s modification of canons of construction in Small); Carnero
v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Small as recognizing the
presumption against extraterritorial application); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2006) (citing Small for the “legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends federal statutes
to have only domestic application”); United States v. Gilbert, 430 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citing Small’s discussion of the purpose of § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Strobehn, 421 F.3d 1017,
1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Small’s use of language, context, history and purpose in interpreting a
statute); ARC Ecology v. United States Department of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1097-98 (9th
Cir. 2005) (citing the majority’s “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind”); Bankwest v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1315 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Carnes, J., dissenting) (citing Small’s ordinary presumption of domestic application); SPGGC, Inc.
v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 99 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing Small’s recognition of the
presumption against extraterritorial application); Ofori-Tenkorang v. American International Group,
Inc., 2005 WL 2280211, *5 (S.D.N.Y 2005), vacated on other grounds, 460 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citing Small in support of the prohibition against extraterritorial application); Parlak v. Baker, 374
F. Supp. 2d 551, 560 n.10 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Small as questioning the use of foreign
convictions as predicate offenses); Hubert Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 72, 103 (2005) (citing
Small’s interpretation of the word “any” in context of the entire statute); United States v. Martinelli,
62 M.J. 52, 57 (2005) (citing Small’s use of the presumption against extraterritorial application);
Auer v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 140, 146 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Small’s prohibition on
the use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1)).
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as in Small to support various methods of statutory interpretation.205 The
majority of cases citing the decision are using it to support the use of the
canon against extraterritorial application.206
This is particularly
troubling given the way in which the majority misused this particular
canon.207
One case, Parlak v. Baker, cites Small for its application to foreign
convictions.208 This case is significant because it involves the use of a
foreign conviction to deport an individual for engaging in terrorist
activity.209 In granting habeas relief, the district court for the Eastern
District of Michigan questioned whether the foreign conviction, a 1990
separatism conviction in Turkey, could be used as a predicate conviction
to support a terrorism charge.210 This case in particular highlights the
dangerous precedent set by the majority’s erroneous interpretation of the
statute in Small.211
These cases also draw attention to the need for a more consistent
approach in interpreting statutes because under principles of stare decisis
the misuse of a canon of statutory interpretation could allow that misuse
by other courts.212 Allowing courts to pick and choose the sources and
methods they will use to interpret statutes causes uncertainty for all
involved including legislatures, courts, and the public.213
V. CONCLUSION
The correct interpretation of § 922(g)(1), when properly applying
methods of statutory interpretation, is that the words “convicted in any

205. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 458; Spector, 545 U.S. at 146; Strobehn, 421 F.3d at 1025; Hubert
Enters., Inc., 125 T.C. at 103.
206. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 372; Carnero, 433 F.3d at 7; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1106; ARC
Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1097-98; Bankwest, 411 F.3d at 1315 n. 6; SPGGC, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 87,
99; Martinelli, 62 M.J. at 57; Ofori-Tenkorang, 2005 WL 2280211, at *5.
207. See supra notes 164-195 and accompanying text (discussing the majority’s use of the
presumption against extraterritorial application).
208. Parlak, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 560 n.10.
209. Id.; see also Lester, supra note 120, at 649 (arguing that the majority’s interpretation has
resulted in a weakening of gun control regulations which has dangerous implications for national
security).
210. Parlak, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
211. See supra notes 114-197 and accompanying text (discussing the problems and dangers
posed by the majority’s interpretation).
212. See supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text.
213. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2086-88 (2002) (proposing that Congress enact federal rules of statutory interpretation
to improve legislative-judicial communication and provide consistency in statutory interpretation
cases).
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court” include convictions in foreign courts.214
The majority opinion has created a dangerous loophole for
criminals in its flawed interpretation of § 922(g)(1).215 The result of the
Court’s misinterpretation of § 922(g)(1) is to allow potentially
dangerous persons to possess firearms within the borders of the United
States, contrary to the purpose of § 922(g)(1).216 Congress can correct
the distortion of this specific statute by passing the proposed amendment
to § 922.217
However, the larger problem presented by Small is the distortion
that results not only to individual statutes, but also to canons of
construction when courts stray too far from the plain language of the law
and misapply the canons.218 This distortion is illustrated in the
majority’s invention of an “assumption about the reach of domestically
oriented statutes,” which it fashioned from a justification from the
longstanding canon against extraterritorial application.219
This problem will not be solved simply by amending § 922(g)(1).220
The solution to this problem lies in a more consistent approach to
statutory interpretation.221 The proper approach would include a
stronger adherence to the plain meaning of the statute, less reliance on
outside sources, and a disciplined application of canons of
construction.222
Michelle Schuld

214. See supra notes 123-195 and accompanying text (discussing the proper interpretation of
§ 922(g)(1) in Small).
215. See supra notes 131-140 and accompanying text (discussing the “absurd results” canon
and pointing out the dangers posed by not including foreign convictions as predicate offenses).
216. See supra notes 155-163 and accompanying text (exploring the legislative purpose behind
the Gun Control Act).
217. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (setting forth the language of proposed
amendments to § 922(g)(1); supra note 198 (analyzing potential Congressional action in regard to
this amendment).
218. See supra notes 123-195 and accompanying text (discussing various canon of statutory
interpretation and criticizing the majority’s application of these canons in the Small decision).
219. See supra notes 164-195 and accompanying text (discussing the canon against
extraterritorial application and arguing this canon was misapplied by the majority in Small).
220. See S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1168, 110th Cong. (2007); see also supra notes
196-203 and accompanying text (discussing the potential impact on future legislation).
221. See supra notes 123-195 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 123-195 and accompanying text.
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